(showing 11-18 of 18)
Indeed every monad must be different from every other. For there are never in nature two beings, which are precisely alike, and in which it is not possible to find some difference which is internal, or based on some intrinsic quality. Gottfried Leibniz#Alike 44
Gottfried Leibniz#Alike 44
I also take it as granted that every created thing, and consequently the created monad also, is subject to change, and indeed that this change is continual in each one. Gottfried Leibniz#Change 35
Gottfried Leibniz#Change 35
But in simple substances the influence of one monad over another is ideal only. Gottfried Leibniz#Another 33
Gottfried Leibniz#Another 33
I maintain also that substances, whether material or immaterial, cannot be conceived in their bare essence without any activity, activity being of the essence of substance in general. Gottfried Leibniz#Activity 31
Gottfried Leibniz#Activity 31
Now where there are no parts, there neither extension, nor shape, nor divisibility is possible. And these monads are the true atoms of nature and, in a word, the elements of things. Gottfried Leibniz#Atoms 30
Gottfried Leibniz#Atoms 30
For since it is impossible for a created monad to have a physical influence on the inner nature of another, this is the only way in which one can be dependent on another. Gottfried Leibniz#Another 27
Gottfried Leibniz#Another 27
There are also two kinds of truths: truth of reasoning and truths of fact. Truths of reasoning are necessary and their opposite is impossible; those of fact are contingent and their opposite is possible. Gottfried Leibniz#Contingent 18
Gottfried Leibniz#Contingent 18
I do not conceive of any reality at all as without genuine unity. Gottfried Leibniz#Conceive 16
Gottfried Leibniz#Conceive 16
Forgotten your password?
New to AllAuthor.
Already have an account.
